


The Battle of Dreux – 1562

Scenario conditions: ZF = 4, 12 Turns, Side 2 first move, Side 1 victorious if draw



TERRAIN KEY

UNIT KEY

- Open
- Hill
- Woods
- Marsh
- Village
- Impassable
- Shoreline
- River
- Stream
- Ditch
- Hedgerows
- Field Fortifications
- Wing Boundary

- Commander
- Commander
- Foot
- Foot
- Horse
- Horse
- Ordnance
- Ordnance

Side 1: Royalists

Wing 1: C1:C4

Wing 2: A5:C8

Reserve: A1:B4

1. Francis, duc de Guise	1/1	11. Landsknecht foot	^TF/
2. Marechal Saint-André	o/o	12. St. André chevaux-léger	vTH-->
3. Anne de Montmorency	o/1	13. Avant garde artillery	^MO
4. Montmorency gendarmes	TH+-->>	14. Enfants perdus	vTF"<
5. Sansac chevaux-léger	vTH-->	15. Martigues Foot	^VF/
6. French and Breton foot	^RF/	16. Guise gendarmes	vTH+-->>
7. Swiss foot	^^VF/>	17. Guise reserve	vVH+-->>
8. Bataille artillery	MO	18. Spanish foot	^TF/=
9. Enfants perdus	vTF"<	19. Spanish arquebusiers	vVF"<
10. d'Amville gendarmes	vTH+-->>		

Side 2: Huguenots

Wing 1: D1:F6

Wing 2: D7:F8

1. Louis, Prince of Condé	o/1	10. Reiters	TH+=<
2. Gaspard de Coligny	1/1	11. Reiters	TH+=<
3. Coligny gendarmes	VH+-->>	12. Artillery	MO
4. Rochefoucault gendarmes	vTH+-->>	13. Enfants perdus	vTF"<
5. de Mouy & Avelar gendarmes	vTH+-->>	14. French Foot	^^RF/<
6. Condé gendarmes	VH+-->>	15. Landsknechts	^TF/
7. Argoulets	vTH"<	16. Landsknechts	^TF/
8. Reiters	TH+=<	17. Reserve Reiters	^TH+=<
9. Reiters	TH+=<		

Design notes:

The main source for the OOB and course of the battle is *L'année 1562 et la bataille de Dreux* (1894), a nineteenth century analysis by French officer Raymond de Coynart. Sir Charles Oman's *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (1937) is a useful supplementary resource despite some OOB discrepancies. *The King's Army* by Dr. James Wood (Cambridge University Press, 2010) is an excellent recent study of the Royalist army and the battle itself. The *Discourses* of La Noue have some fascinating firsthand insights from a Huguenot perspective.

Turns represent ~20 minutes, zones represent ~400 m. Units have a nominal base strength of ~1000 foot or ~500 horse. However, as with most 16th century battles, foot units will almost invariably be depicted as Large or Very Large units, while many horse units will be depicted as Small.

The artwork seen in the examples of play is derived from the detailed series of engravings by Tortorel and Perressin, which show the troop dispositions and course of the battle in a series of five stages. While an excellent resource, and in some ways the inspiration for this entire project, these do suffer from a few limitations. All infantry formations are depicted as the same size, despite a wide range of formations and unit sizes, and the battle is "viewed" from a fixed position at the southeastern corner of the battlefield, which makes the Huguenot units appear larger. This art has been minimally modified to fit the historical battlefield topography, and scale unit art appropriately. While I have adopted Tortorel and Perressin's convention for depicting infantry formations, the unit modifiers reflect the different sizes, compositions, and formations of these units.

The scenario begins at approximately 1 pm when the Huguenot leaders, having stumbled upon the Royalist army while in road column, decided that escape was impossible and decided to charge the Royalist gendarmerie. The scenario ends at ~5 pm, as the early December nightfall put an end to what had become a chaotic and indecisive cavalry skirmish, allowing the armies to disengage without pursuit.

Some of the unit classifications may be initially surprising. The Spanish infantry unit is classed as Trained, despite the fearsome reputation of the tercios in this era, based on a letter from Juan de Ayala, commander of the Spanish troops, to his brother at the English court, in which he mentions that roughly half of the infantry sent from the Netherlands deserted before they reached Paris – these may not have been elite troops, and enthusiasm was low. In any case, the detached musketeers are rated as veteran, reflecting Spanish mastery of these small unit tactics.

Martigues foot regiment, which formed square to hold off Huguenot cavalry as night fell, is rated veteran. Despite the artwork, the large formation of Huguenot Foot is mostly arquebusiers, with few steady pikemen. The Swiss are veterans of course, and at a nominal 6000 men could barely fit in a single zone – I considered their formation of 90+ percent pikemen to be more compact than those containing more shot. All landsknechts are rated as Trained, though both sides at Dreux were disappointed with their performance – maybe just some bad dice rolling that day. Their composition of very roughly 50% shot is the "standard" against which other contemporary infantry formations are measured.

All gendarmes and chevaux-léger are assumed to be deployed in a single rank, following Coynart. Reiters were given the heavy armor attribute, while chevaux-léger were not. This works well to reflect their historical performance at Dreux, but may be somewhat historically arbitrary (see official variants). Chevaux-léger have some very limited shooting ability, reflecting their use of pistols alongside lances. Note they are depicted as heavily armored as gendarmes in the engravings – this may reflect the later practice of the Second War of Religion, when many of these units were upgraded.

Neither side displayed sophisticated control of the battlefield – leaders charged with their gendarmes, and command threshold will be at a premium throughout the battle. Montmorency, 70 years old, was always

more courageous than shrewd, and was defeated and captured often throughout his career. He is given a rating of 0/1 to reflect his totemic value as Constable of France. Condé gets a similar rating, for similar reasons, as a prince of the royal blood. Coligny (1/1) was a more capable leader, able to rally some disordered cavalry for a final effort late in the battle.

The position of Guise is more difficult. The leading political figure of the regency government, he was officially in command of no more than his own gendarme company, possibly in deference to Montmorency, with whom he was trying to mend fences. Nevertheless, he seems to have been a sort of shadow commander-in-chief. La Noue attributes the delayed engagement of the Royalist right to Guise, rather than Saint-André (0/0), the nominal commander of the right wing. Guise's acumen is reflected in his 1/1 rating, which will generate valuable command threshold. A variant allows him to start the battle in the C-in-C role, rather than being held in reserve.

If turns run out without a clear victor (the historical outcome), the Royalists will be narrow victors, by having blocked the Huguenot advance into Normandy. With their inferiority in cavalry and an ongoing effort to negotiate a political solution to the conflict, the Royalist leadership was not seeking a decisive battle of annihilation.

Official Variants:

1. The battle was fought close to the winter solstice, and nightfall brought the struggle to an inconclusive end. Treat the last two turns as happening in Darkness.
2. Landsknecht infantry underperformed on both sides at this battle and can be classed as Raw. The Spanish unit can optionally be classed as Veteran.
3. Chevaux-léger units can be rated as heavily armored, or reiter units can be rated without heavy armor.
4. Instead of starting with a reserve wing, the Royalists can start with a right wing A1:C4, with both Guise and Saint-André as commanders in the wing.

Sources:

Coynart, Raymond de. *L'année 1562 et la bataille de Dreux: étude historique et militaire; extraits divers, correspondances officielles du temps.* France: Firmin-Didot et cie, 1894.

La Noue, François de. *The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de la Noue: Whereunto are Adioyned Certaine Obseruations of the Same Author, of Things Happened During the Three Late Ciuill Warres of France : with a True Declaration of Manie Particulars Touching the Same.* United Kingdom: T.C. and E.A., 1587.

Oman, Charles. *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century.* United Kingdom: Greenhill Books, 1999.

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Juan De Ayala to Pedro De Ayala.

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